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History: Cold War
Russia vs. USA
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- My Favourite Groups
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Russian Subtitles On:
code breakers == 
взломщики кодов
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Cryptanalysis
from Greek 
• kryptós, "hidden“
• analýein, "to untie“
Term coined in 1920 
by William F. Friedman.
• Born in Moldavia
• Chief cryptologist at NSA,1950s.
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History: 1918
• Tzarist secret services
=> continued their work with the armies of white generals. 
• In 1918 - 1920 almost all encrypted correspondence of the Soviet 
Army and Government was easily broken by 
• the white (counterrevolutionary) armed forces 
• the British
• the Swedish 
• the Polish: broke key messages and won the War against 
Russia in 1920-1921
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1930
1930: Russian code breaker Bokiy broke a U.S. code. 
• US ciphers were really not good at that time…
– In 1929 US government disbanded its Federal crypto services 
because… “Gentlemen don’t read each other’s mail”…
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Fialka = Фиалка = Violet = M-125
Around 1965.
MUCH stronger than Enigma…
Used until 1987 in East Germany…
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Fialka Versions
• Each country of the Warsaw pact had their own version
• Different keyboard, different fonts…
• Different SECRET set of 10 wheels. 
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Cold War Soviet Cryptanalysis
• Soviet Union was breaking codes and employed at least 
100 cryptologists…
[Source: Cryptologia, interviews by David Kahn 
with gen. Andreev=first head of FAPSI=Russian NSA]
Example: In 1967 GRU (Soviet Intelligence) was intercepting 
cryptograms from 115 countries, using 152 cryptosystems, 
and among these they broke 11 codes and “obtained” 7 
other codes. 
GOST, Self-Similarity and Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers
© Nicolas T. Courtois, 2006-201214
Was Fialka Broken?
• Israel have captured Fialka machines during the 6-day war in 1967 and 
… nothing more was disclosed. 
• Austria would intercept and decrypt a fair proportion of Fialka traffic 
during the Cold War…
• In the 1970s the NSA would build a supercomputer to decrypt Fialka
routinely
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Secret Specs: ROTORS vs. S-boxes
FIALKA GOST
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Compare: Rotors of Enigma [1930s]
• The specs of Enigma were 
reverse-engineered by the Polish 
in early 1930s in tight collaboration with French 
intelligence… [and the British].
• Finding the rotors by Marian Rejewski was much 
harder than daily code breaking at Bletchley Park…
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US Ciphers
• US/NATO: 
Russia broke the NATO KW-7 cipher machine   
– the NSA did not see it was weak…
– The spec became known because of a spy ring 
– by John A .Walker Jr + family.
– was paid more than 1M USD (source: NSA)
– to this day the spec has NOT been made public
• greatest exploit in KGB history, 
• allowed the Soviet Union to “read millions” of 
American messages [1989, Washington Post]
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Walker Amazing Machine
Walker obtained from the KGB a pocket machine to read the 
connections of rotors of KL-7
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Modern Cryptanalysis
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Algebraic Cryptanalysis [Shannon]
Breaking a « good » cipher should require:
“as much work as solving a system of 
simultaneous equations in a large number 
of unknowns of a complex type”
[Shannon, 1949]
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Motivation
Linear and differential cryptanalysis usually 
require huge quantities of known/chosen 
plaintexts.
Q: What kind of cryptanalysis is possible 
when the attacker has 
only one known plaintext (or very few) ? 
LOW DATA CRYPTANALYSIS
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Two Worlds:
• The “approximation” cryptanalysis:
– Linear, differential, approximation, attacks etc.. 
– based on probabilistic characteristics 
• true with some probability.
– consequently, the security will grow exponentially with 
the number of rounds, and so does the number of 
required plaintexts in the attacks 
• main limitation in practice.
• The “exact algebraic” approach:
– Write equations to solve, true with probability 1.
=> 
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Algebraic Attacks on Block Ciphers
1. Write + 
2. Solve [key recovery].
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Algebraic Attacks on Block Ciphers
Gröbner Bases: 
• Optimising the expansion step 2. at high degree.
• Mostly the dense case is understood and implemented. 
• Then either AES-128 is broken at up to say 4 [Gwenolé
Ars thesis: maybe it is?]. AND if not at this degree, it must 
be secure (!). 
Fast Algebraic Attacks [will just explain]: 
• Avoid expansion, start with BIGGER initial systems but 
never allow any expansion or increase in the degree.
• Sparse case ! Essential problems: preserve sparsity.
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2. Fast Algebraic Attacks On 
Block Ciphers
GOST, Self-Similarity and Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers
© Nicolas T. Courtois, 2006-201226
Fast Algebraic Attacks on Block Ciphers
Definition [informal on purpose] Methods to lower the degree of equations 
that appear throughout the computations… [e.g. max deg in F4] 
(more generally need to substantially lower the memory requirements of algebraic attacks compared to their running time).
⇒ Very rich galaxy of attacks to be studied in the next 20 years…
How to lower the degree ? 
• by having several P/C pairs (bigger yet much easier !)
• by CPA, CPCA, etc…
• by fixing internal variables (Guess-then-Algebraic).
• by finding [approximate] equations on bigger blocks 
– by interpolation [cf. W. Meier’s talk]
– by guessing equations that have strong bias 
• Linear-Algebraic or Bi-Linear-Algebraic Cryptanalysis
• Differential-Algebraic.
• by clever choice of representation
• by introducing new variables (oh yes !)
• by having a larger key
• new tricks to be invented ?
cumulative 
effect
!!!
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3. Solving Methods…
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3.3. ElimLin – The Most Surprising.
Complete description:
• Find linear equations in the linear span.
• Substitute, and repeat.
Amazingly powerful…
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3.3. ElimLin – Remark:
In a way it is:
Doing things which Gröbner bases usually 
ignore or do not care about 
at ”degree 1.05” …
(very small number of higher-degree monomials).
GOST, Self-Similarity and Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers
© Nicolas T. Courtois, 2006-201230
3.4. ANF-to-CNF - The Outsider
Before we did try, 
we actually never believed it could work…
☺ ☺ ☺
Convert MQ to a SAT problem.
(both are NP-hard problems)
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3.4. ANF-to-CNF - The Outsider
Principle 1: 
each monomial = one dummy variable.
d+1 clauses for each degree d monomial
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Also
Principle 2: 
Handling XORs – Not obvious. Long XORs
known to be hard problems for SAT solvers.
• Split longer XORs in several shorter with 
more dummy variables.
• About 4 h clauses for a XOR of size h.
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ANF-to-CNF
This description is enough to produce a 
working version.
Space for non-trivial optimisations. See: 
Gregory V. Bard, Nicolas T. Courtois and Chris Jefferson: 
“Efficient Methods for Conversion and Solution of Sparse 
Systems of Low-Degree Multivariate Polynomials over 
GF(2) via SAT-Solvers”.
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Ready Software
Several ready programs to perform this 
conversion are made available on this web 
page:
www.cryptosystem.net/aes/tools.html
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SAT Solvers
in the Cloud
UCL spin-off 
company
solving SAT 
problems
on demand…
commercial 
but also for free…
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Solving SAT
What are SAT solvers?
Heuristic algorithms for solving SAT problems.
• Guess some variables.
• Examine consequences.
• If a contradiction found, I can add a new clause saying “In 
this set of constraints one is false”.
Very advanced area of research.
Introduction for “dummies”: 
Gregory Bard PhD thesis.
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MiniSat 2.0. 
Winner of SAT-Race 2006 competition.
An open-source SAT solver package, 
by Niklas Eén, Niklas Sörensson, 
More recent version [2012]: 
CryptoMiniSat 2.92. 
improved by Mate Soos, 
added also some linear algebra…
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Ready Software for Windows
Ready programs:
www.cryptosystem.net/aes/tools.html
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ANF-to-CNF + MiniSat 2.0.
Gives amazing results in algebraic cryptanalysis of 
just any (not too complex/not too many rounds) 
cipher, cf. (VSH). Also for random sparse MQ.
• Certain VERY large systems solved in seconds 
on PC (thousands of variables !).
• Few take a couple hours/days…
• Then infeasible, sharp increase.
Jump from 0 to ∞.
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What Are the Limitations of Algebraic Attacks ?
• When the number of rounds grows: 
complexity jumps from 0 to ∞.
• With new attacks and new “tricks” being 
proposed: some systems are suddenly 
broken with no effort. 
=> jumps from ∞ to nearly 0 !
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DES
At a first glance, 
DES seems to be a very poor target: 
there is (apparently) 
no strong algebraic structure 
of any kind in DES
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What’s Left ?
Idea 1: (IOH)
Algebraic I/O relations. 
Theorem [Courtois-Pieprzyk]:
Every S-box has a low I/O degree. 
=>3 for DES.
Idea 2: (VSH)
DES has been designed to be implemented in 
hardware. 
=> Very-sparse quadratic equations at the price of 
adding some 40 new variables per S-box.
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Results ?
Both Idea 1 (IOH) and Idea 2 (VSH)
(and some 20 other I have tried…) 
can be exploited in working 
key recovery attacks. 
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S-boxes S1-S4 [Matthew Kwan]
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S-boxes S5-S8 [Matthew Kwan]
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I / O Degree
A “good” cipher should use at least some 
components with high I/O degree.
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Results on DES
Nicolas T. Courtois and Gregory V. Bard: 
Algebraic Cryptanalysis of the D.E.S.
In IMA conference 2007, pp. 152-169, 
LNCS 4887, Springer. 
See also: 
eprint.iacr.org/2006/402/
GOST, Self-Similarity and Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers
© Nicolas T. Courtois, 2006-201248
What Can Be Done ?
Idea 1 (Cubic IOH) + ElimLin: 
We recover the key of 5-round DES with 
3 KP faster than brute force. 
• When 23 variables fixed, takes 173 s.
• Magma crashes > 2 Gb of RAM.
Idea 2 (VSH40) + ANF-to-CNF + MiniSat 2.0.: 
Key recovery for 6-round DES. Only 1 KP (!).
• Fix 20 variables takes 68 s. 
• Magma crashes with > 2 Gb. 
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And GOST?
Essentially the same software methods…
well, actually with a lot of non-trivial super-compact representation 
and circuit optimisation work, cf. our paper at 
http://2012.sharcs.org/record.pdf.
… allow also to break 
up to 8 rounds of GOST…
Can we hope to break 32 rounds?
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4. Self Similarity 
or What’s Wrong With 
Some Ciphers
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KEY IDEA
REDUCE the complexity. 
For example:
REDUCE the number of rounds.
How? Use self-similarity and high-level structure.
Magic process which allows the attacker to 
guess/determine values INSIDE the cipher.
We now call it Algebraic Complexity Reduction
[Courtois 2011]
P P Q
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4.1. Crypto-1 Cipher
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Waste of Silicon
MiFare was manufactured by Philips, now 
NXP, and licensed to Infineon.
BUT, even a hardware or software designer 
would NOT notice how weak the cipher is. 
Camouflage?
Due to a combination with another terrible 
weakness half of the silicon is wasted…
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Waste of Silicon
Internal bits are computed 2-3 times.
One could save half of the gates!
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“Courtois Dark Side” Attack on MiFare Classic
Cf. eprint.iacr.org/2009/137. Basic Facts:
It is a multiple differential attack.
Form of multiple “self-similarity” as well..
I exhibit a differential that 
• holds simultaneously for 256 differentials this works with 
probability of about 1/17.
• for 8 differentials the probability is about 0.75 (!!).
Both are differences on 51 bits of the state of the cipher.
A VERY STRONG property(!).
GOST, Self-Similarity and Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers
© Nicolas T. Courtois, 2006-201257
Summary
• We broke >1 billion smart cards covering 70 % of the 
contactless badge/ticketing market.
• Our attack require more than 10 times less data than the 
Dutch attacks about which there were 10 000 press 
reports…
• Security of many buildings (banks, military, UK Cabinet 
Office) is badly compromised.
• Security of many transport [metro,bus] and parking cards 
worldwide is badly compromised.
• Property and important assets [e;g.  government and 
financial data] are directly under threat.
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4.3. Self-Similarity and KeeLoq
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KeeLoq
• Designed in the 80's by Willem Smit. 
• In 1995 sold to Microchip Inc for 
more than 10 Million of US$.
??
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How Secure is KeeLoq
According to  Microchip, KeeLoq should have ``a 
level of security comparable to DES''. Yet faster.
Miserably bad cipher, main reason:
its periodic structure: cannot be defended. The complexity of most attacks on 
KeeLoq does NOT depend on the number of rounds of KeeLoq.
GOST, Self-Similarity and Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers
© Nicolas T. Courtois, 2006-201261
Notation
f_k() – 64 rounds of KeeLoq
g_k() – 16 rounds of KeeLoq, prefix of f_k().
We have: E_k = g_k o f8_k.
528 = 16+8*64 rounds.
GOST, Self-Similarity and Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers
© Nicolas T. Courtois, 2006-201262
4.4. Sliding Properties 
of KeeLoq
[and one simple attack from FSE 2008]
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Sliding Attacks – 2 Cases
• Complete periodicity [classical].
• Incomplete periodicity [new] – harder.
– KeeLoq: Q is a functional prefix of P. Helps a lot.
P P P
P P P Q
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Sliding Attacks
Classical Sliding Attack [Grossman-Tuckerman 1977]: 
• Take 2n/2 known plaintexts (here n=32, easy !)
• We have a “slid pair” (Pi,Pj) s.t. 
Gives an unlimited number of other sliding pairs !!!
64
rounds
64
rounds
64
rounds
64
rounds
64
rounds
64
rounds
64
rounds
64
rounds
Pi
Pj
Pj Ci
Cj
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KeeLoq and Sliding
Apply Classical Sliding? Attack 1.
• Take 2n/2 known plaintexts (here n=32, easy !)
• We have a “slid pair” (Pi,Pj) s.t. 
Classical sliding fails – because of the “odd” 16 rounds:
64
rounds
64
rounds
64
rounds
64
rounds
16
r
64
rounds
64
rounds
64
rounds
64
rounds
16
r
Pi
Pj
Pj
Cj
Ci
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Classical Sliding –Not Easy
Classical Sliding Attack [Grossmanl i l li i -Tuckerman 1977]: 
• Take 2n/2/ known plaintexts (here l i n=32, easy !)
• We have a “slid pairli i ” (Pii ,Pjj).
HARD - Problem:
64
rounds
64
rounds
64
rounds
64
rounds
16
r
64
rounds
64
rounds
64
rounds
64
rounds
16
r
Pi
Pj
Pj
Cj
Ci
What’s the values here ?
528512
464 528
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Algebraic Sliding
Answer [Courtois, Bard, Wagner FSE2008]:
64
rounds
64
rounds
64
rounds
64
rounds
16
r
64
rounds
64
rounds
64
rounds
64
rounds
16
r
Pi
Pj
Pj
Cj
Ci
Ci
don’t care about these
528512
464 528
look here !
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Algebraic Attack [FSE 2008]
We are able to use Ci,Cj directly !
Write and merge 2 systems of equations:
64
rounds
64
rounds
64
rounds
64
rounds
16
r
64
rounds
64
rounds
64
rounds
64
rounds
16
r
Pi
Pj
Pj
Cj
Ci
Ci
528512
464 528ignore all these !
common 
64-bit key
32 
bits
32 
bits
32 
bits
32 
bits
0 16
(like 2 different ciphers)
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System of Equations
64-bit key. Two pairs on 32 bits. 
Just enough information.
Attack:
• Write an MQ system.
• Gröbner Bases methods – miserably fail.
• Convert to a SAT problem
• [Cf. Courtois, Bard, Jefferson, eprint/2007/024/].
• Solve it. 
• Takes 2.3 seconds on a PC with MiniSat 2.0.
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Attack Summary:
Given about 216 KP.
We try all 232 pairs (Pi,Pj).
• If OK, it takes 2.3 seconds to find the 64-bit 
key. 
• If no result - early abort.
Total attack complexity about 264 CPU clocks 
which is about 253 KeeLoq encryptions. 
GOST, Self-Similarity and Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers
© Nicolas T. Courtois, 2006-201271
4.6. Snow 2.0. Cipher
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ISO
• Less than 10 crypto algorithms were ever 
standardized by ISO. E.g. AES.
• All in ISO 18033.
– Snow 2.0. is an international standard for 
stream cipher encryption.
– In 2010 the Russian National Standard GOST  
was also submitted to ISO 18033 to become an 
international standard.
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I / O Degree (a.k.a. [Graph] Alg. Immunity)
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Modular Addition
+ modulo 232
in several ciphers: GOST, SNOW 2.0.
GOST, Self-Similarity and Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers
© Nicolas T. Courtois, 2006-201275
Modular Addition I/O Degree = 2
Quadratic. More importantly: 
Quadratic I/O without extra variables
(the ci can be all eliminated)
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MC (+ Mod 2n) = n-1
Proof:
we have:
xy + (x + y)c = 
(x + c)(y + c) – c2
1x each
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Conditional A.I. = Conditional I/O Degree
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Conditional Describing Degree
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This paper:
For + mod 2n: We show that:
• The Conditional Describing Degree is 1 (!)
• Is it trivial? Well, we know that for minus 
mod 2n: consider x-y=0. 
– Where (x,y) is the input, 0 is the fixed output.
• NEW: Holds also for + mod 2n: consider 
x+y=111111…111.
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This paper:
For + mod 2n:
• The Conditional Describing Degree is 1 (!)
• So what? 
– View it as follows: fix n linear equations, get 2n!
• Amplification…
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This paper:
Larger Blocks of Snow 2.0. 
• However some equations can be more 
interesting than others.
– How to generate (lots of) extra degree falls 
elsewhere, because of the structure of Snow?
– This is not wishful thinking. We constructed 
such an attack a particularly good one.
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4.7. High-Level Attacks 
on Snow 2.0.
[Courtois-Debraize ICICS 2008]
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Moreover:
• If I have to assume that the output for whole 32-
bit + mod 2n: is one specific value – this will 
happen with VERY LOW probability. 
• We can do much better: 
We present a LARGE family of outputs, not only 
00000 or 111 for which the + mod 2n: can be 
partly linearized. 
Interest: we want to fix some WELL CHOSEN bits, 
determine other. 
How? Structure of Snow dictates that.
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*BTW: Link to LC
• Is it LC with multiple approximations? 
• Not at all, all the equations hold 
simultaneously.
• Find 1 linear equation true with probability 
50 % – trivial, no interest.
• Find 10 that simultaneously hold for 50 % o 
inputs of this S-box/operation. Very strong 
and helps AC a lot.
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Conditional algebraic attacks:
Amplification: 
• given n linear assumptions, 
get C*n consequences.
• Find attacks that maximize C!
• A precise measure of “structural” algebraic 
vulnerability.
• C=2 for + mod 2n.
• C=4 for Snow 2.0. Keystream generator. 
– Non-trivial result and method…
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Amplification=4 or How to Linearize Snow?
Fix to 0.
For 9 consecutive 
steps.
Linearizes both +!
And the S-box layer.
n -> 4n equations.
Seems optimal.
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5. GOST Cipher
GOST, Self-Similarity and Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers
© Nicolas T. Courtois, 2006-201288
GOST 28148-89
• The Official Encryption Standard of Russian 
Federation.
• Developed in the 1970s, or the 1980s,
– First "Top Secret" algorithm.
– Downgraded to "Secret" in 1990. 
• Declassified in 1994. 
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Why Declassified
• 1994: 
– By mistake??? 
– No country ever declassified their national 
algorithm.
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Applications of GOST
– Much cheaper to implement than DES, AES 
and any other known cipher… (details later).
– Widely implemented and used:
• Crypto ++, 
• Open SSL, 
• RSA Labs, Etc.
• Central Bank of Russia, 
• other very large Russian banks..
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GOST vs. DES
We hear that: “GOST 28147 “was a Soviet alternative 
to the United States standard algorithm, DES”
– ???? this is just wrong:
– very long key, 256 bits, military-grade
• in theory secure for 200 years…
• not a commercial algorithm for short-term security 
such as DES…
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Can GOST be Used to Encrypt Secret documents?
United States DES 
can be used ONLY for unclassified documents.
In contrast, 
GOST "does not place any limitations on the secrecy level of 
the protected information". 
193.166.3.2/pub/crypt/cryptography/papers/gost/russian-des-preface.ps.gz
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GOST
• Key = 2256 initial settings. 
• S-boxes = 2512 possibilities.
– But if bijective 2354 possibilities.
• Total 2610 (or 2768). 
– Compare to 2151 possibilities 
with FIALKA.
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GOST Boxes
• 8 secret S-boxes. (354 bits of info)
– Central Bank of Russia uses these:
• Secret S-boxes 
are the equivalent 
of secret rotors in FIALKA
• Our attacks work 
for any S-boxes
but they must be known.
– there are methods about how to 
recover the secret S-boxes…
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Analysis of GOST
• It was analysed by Schneier, Biham, 
Biryukov, Dunkelman, Wagner, Pieprzyk, 
Gabidulin,…
• Nobody found an attack…
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*Claims on GOST
Wikipedia April 2011: 
Cryptanalysis of GOST
Compared to DES, GOST has a very simple round function. However, the 
designers of GOST attempted to offset the simplicity of the round 
function by specifying the algorithm with 32 rounds and secret S-
boxes. 
Another concern is that the avalanche effect is slower to occur in GOST 
than in DES. This is because of GOST's lack of an expansion 
permutation in the round function, as well as its use of a rotation 
instead of a permutation. Again, this is offset by GOST's increased 
number of rounds.
There is not much published cryptanalysis of GOST, but a cursory glance 
says that it seems secure (Schneier, 1996). 
The large number of rounds and secret S-boxes makes both linear and 
differential cryptanalysis difficult. Its avalanche effect may be slower to 
occur, but it can propagate over 32 rounds very effectively.
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[Biryukov, Wagner, Eurocrypt 2000]
“Even after considerable amount of time and effort, no 
progress in cryptanalysis of the standard was made in the 
open literature”
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More [Biryukov, Wagner, Eurocrypt 2000]
“GOST looks like a cipher that can be made both arbitrarily 
strong or arbitrarily weak depending on the designer's 
intent since some crucial parts of the algorithm are left 
unspecified.”
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5.2. GOST on 
the International Stage
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Consensus on GOST Security [2010]
Axel Poschmann, San Ling, and Huaxiong Wang:
256 Bit Standardized Crypto for 650 GE – GOST Revisited, 
In CHES 2010
“Despite considerable 
cryptanalytic efforts 
spent in the past 20 years, 
GOST is still not broken.”
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Security + Implementation
Or Why GOST is Very CompetitiveSame paper:  Axel Poschmann, San Ling, and Huaxiong Wang: 256 Bit Standardized Crypto for 650 GE – GOST 
Revisited, In CHES 2010
• GOST-PS, fully Russian standard compliant variant using the S-boxes 
taken from PRESENT cipher: 
– only 651 GE
• The Russian Central Bank version is called GOST-FB, 
– it requires 800 GE
• AES-128 
– requires 3400 GE for a much lower security level!
• DES 
– requires also about 4000 GE…
• PRESENT: 1900 GE for 128-bit version.
in terms of cost/security level claimed GOST is probably 
strictly the best symmetric cipher known…
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GOST and International 
Standards Organization [ISO]
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ISO
• Less than 10 crypto algorithms were ever 
standardized by ISO. E.g. AES.
• All in ISO 18033.
– Four 64-bit block ciphers: 
• e.g. TDES
– Only three 128-bit block ciphers: 
• e.g. AES
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GOST in  ISO
• In 2010 GOST  was also submitted to ISO 
18033 to become an international standard.
• In the mean time GOST was broken.
• Two attacks were published in early 2011:
– One by Takanori Isobe [FSE 2011].
– One by Nicolas Courtois [eprint/2011/211].
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Future of GOST in ISO
• Our report [eprint/2011/211] was officially 
submitted to ISO.
• It says: […] to standardize GOST now 
would be really dangerous and 
irresponsible […]
• But Why? 
– Half-broken in very serious sense
– Really broken in academic sense
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What’s Wrong? >50 distinct attacks… Best = 2101
Self-similarity
Weak Key Schedule
high-
level
low-
level
Reflection Slide Fixed P. Involution
AC / Software / SAT Solvers
MITM
Guess Then …
“Algebraic Complexity Reduction”
Poor Diffusion
combination 
attacks
Combinatorial 
Optimisation
m lt ple points, HO
best = 2101multiple random keys
cf. 2011/626
2179
2012/138
Truncated
Differentials (DC)
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6. Algebraic Complexity 
Reduction 
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[Black Box] Reduction Paradigm
Black-box 
high-level
guess and determine methods 
which transform
an attack … into another…
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Reductions
• Given 2X KP for the full 32-round GOST.
• Obtain Y KP for 8 rounds of GOST.
• This valid with probability 2-Z. 
• For a proportion 2-T of GOST keys. 
Some 40 distinct reductions of this type 
with a large variety of X,Y, Z, T
can be found in
eprint/2011/626
GOST, Self-Similarity and Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers
© Nicolas T. Courtois, 2006-2012110
Example
• Given 232 KP for the full 32-round GOST.
• Obtain 4 KP for 8 rounds of GOST.
• This valid with probability 2-128. 
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Is Algebraic Complexity 
Reduction Already Known?
There exists many known attacks which enter the framework of Algebraic 
Complexity Reduction:
• Slide attacks
• Fixed Point Attacks
• Cycling Attacks
• Involution Attacks
• Guessing [Conditional Algebraic Attacks]
• Etc..
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What’s New?
Slide / Fixed Point / Cycling / Guessing / Etc..
WHAT’S NEW? 
• There are now many completely new attacks 
which are exactly none of the above [though similar or related].
• Many new attacks are possible and many of these attacks were never 
studied because they generate only a few known plaintexts, and only 
in the last 5 years it became possible to design an appropriate last 
step for these attacks which is a low-data complexity key recovery 
attack [e.g. algebraic, MITM].
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Feistel Schemes
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2x Same
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6.2. Structure of GOST
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Self-Similar Key Schedule
Periodic Repetition + Inversed Order
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16*48 subsets of 56 bits.
*Compare: DES
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Fixed Points: DES Key Schedule
• Can DES key be periodic?
• After step 1= key for R1
• After step 8=key for R8
• After step 15=key for R15
• We have a pattern G
of length 7 which repeats twice.
• Unhappily G = + 13 mod 28 (and not 14)
• Does NOT have many fixed points.
R1 R8 R15
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Last 16 Rounds of GOST
“Theorem Which Won World War 2”, 
[I. J. Good and Cipher A. Deavours, afterword to: Marian Rejewski, "How Polish 
Mathematicians Deciphered the Enigma", Annals of the History of Computing, 
3 (3), July 1981, 229-232]
P and 
Q-1 o P o Q
have the same cycle structure 
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Last 16 Rounds of GOST
“Theorem Which Won World War 2”, 
⇒ Has exactly 232 fixed points (order 1) 
and 264-232 points of order 2.
⇒ A lot of fixed points (very few for DES). 
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6.3. Complexity Reduction 
in Guess-Then-Determine attacks
Reason: Self-Similarity
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6.3.1. Guess-Then-Determine: 
Amplification
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Amplification
Killer examples:
• Slide attacks – unlimited.
• Weak Key Family 3 in GOST –
VERY large => attack on GOST with 2159 
per key
GOST, Self-Similarity and Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers
© Nicolas T. Courtois, 2006-2012124
6.4. Complexity Reduction: 
First Example:
Relaxing the Requirements 
of A Sliding Attack
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Black Box Reduction:
Pseudo-Sliding Attack
[Cryptologia Jan 2012]
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One Encryption
E
GOST, Self-Similarity and Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers
© Nicolas T. Courtois, 2006-2012127
Two Encryptions with A Slide
not
similar
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Assumptions
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Assumptions
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Reduction
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New Attack on GOST
264 KP
guess A,B
correct P=2-128 P=2-128
=>
4 pairs 
for 8 rounds
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Final Key Recovery 8R
4 Pairs, 8 rounds.
The key is found within
2110
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Overall Attack
2128+110 GOST computations.
217 times faster than brute force.
Not the best attack yet.
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Cryptologia [Jan 2012]
Editorial:
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6.5. More Single Key Attacks…
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Many more single-key attacks on full 32-round GOST…
cf. eprint.iacr.org/2011/626/
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Science ≠ Politics
Main paper was submitted to Asiacrypt 2011.
One referee wrote: “I think that the audiences of 
Asiacrypt will not feel it is interesting.”
=>however about half of papers accepted at this Asiacrypt are about things 
about which nobody ever heard, not even professional cryptologists 
(say JH42, Armadillo,theory, incremental research, things which 
would interest very few people)…, not to say it would interest anybody 
in the industry or government circles…
=>HOW many times it ever happened at Asiacrypt that a military-grade 
cipher, and an official government standard of a major country, used 
by large banks, implemented in SSL, was broken, while being in the 
process of being standardized by ISO to become a global industrial 
standard? Not many times. 
⇒ impacting potentially all of: national critical infrastructures, key 
financial systems and even ordinary computer software
⇒ It could be worth tens of billions of dollars to fix problems due to GOST..
⇒ For now nothing bad happened, just some bad press. 
⇒ BUT: Is GOST really broken? 
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Science ≠ Politics
But is GOST really so bad? 
When it was submitted to ISO, and only then, 
suddenly some cryptanalysts tried to break it… And succeeded.
And there is now more than 50 attacks… Academic attacks. 
We do in “the West” ☺ put VERY HIGH super-paranoid 
requirements on security of ciphers…
⇒ It is debatable whether the Russian designers of GOST ever thought 
that it should not have attacks faster than 2256…
⇒ Remember that GOST can have a secondary key: secret S-boxes. 
Even today, in spite of all our 20+ attacks, GOST is better than any 
comparable cipher: 
Look at the (best attack) / 
(implementation cost) ratio 
– Key schedule could be easily fixed to avoid academic shortcut attacks…
– GOST-P is even better (better S-box <= PRESENT: new ISO standard).
cf. Poschmann et al CHES 2010
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6.6. Black Box Reduction:
Reflection Attack
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Reflection – Happens 232 Times - KPA
• guess A det C 
info=64 cost=2-32
• guess B
info=64+64 cost=2-64
• [guess D
info=64 cost=2-32 ]
Summary: we get 2/3 KP for 8R for 
the price of 2-96/2-128. 
break 8R 2KP 2127
=> break 32R D=232 T=2223
break 8R 3KP 2110
=> break 32R D=232 T=2238
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6.7. Double Reflection Attack
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2x Reflection, Happens About Once:
• guess C det A
info=64 cost=2-32
• guess B det Z
info=64+64+64 cost=2-64
• [guess D
info=64 cost=2-32 ]
Summary: we get 3/4 KP for 
8R for the price of 2-96/2-128
break 8R 3KP 2110
=> break 32R D=264 T=2206
break 8R 4KP 294
=> break 32R D=264 T=2222
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Other Attacks?
Best single key attack: 
D=264 T=2179
Nicolas Courtois: An Improved Differential Attack on Full GOST, 
March 2012, eprint.iacr.org/2012/138.
However ciphers are NEVER used with single keys in the real 
life… On the contrary. 
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7. Multiple Random Key Scenario
“stronger, more versatile 
and MORE practical 
than any known 
single key attack”
???
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7.1. One Triple Reflection Attack
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3x Reflection, Weak Keys 2-64
No guessing => 
Very high amplification.
All data obtained 
nearly “for free”.
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7.2. Combined Attacks: 
DC + Algebraic Complexity 
Reduction
two totally unrelated families of attacks…
…until December 2012
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New Combined Attacks
New attacks from November 2012 combine ALL of 
truncated differentials, fixed points, advanced 
MITM, software/SAT solvers and reflection in 
ONE single attack. Example:
Family 5.3. Fact 47 Section 19.5. 
Given 252 devices with random keys on 256 bits and 
232 ACP (Adaptively Chosen Plaintexts), 
we can recover one GOST key in time of 2139. 
Total data = 284. Mostly used to reject keys which do not satisfy our conditions.
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Combined DC+Algebraic Complexity Reduction
3 KP for 8R obtained, Time(8R)= 2110.
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8. Multiple-Point Events 
and Bicliqes
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Attacks with Multiple Fixed Points and Bicliques
New attacks with multiple related encryptions 
+ additional well-chosen properties, 
as usual.
A form of advanced 
higher-order differential attack.
Greatly decreases the cost of making 
assumptions such as A=B’ etc. 
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Single Key Approximate Multiple Fixed Points
=> all 
8 points
share 
the same 
50 bits!
E(C)=C’
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Attacks with Multiple Fixed Points and Bicliques
Example:
Family 8.4. Fact 73 Section 22.6. 
Given 279 devices with random keys on 256
bits and 232 CP per key we can recover one 
GOST key in time of 2101. 
=> Nearly feasible (for a large intelligence agency). 
=> Further improvements expected…
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8.2. Summary
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The Multiple Key Scenario (1)
cf. eprint.iacr.org/2011/626/
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The Multiple Key Scenario (2)
cf. eprint.iacr.org/2011/626/
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8.3. 
Facts or Fictions?
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July 2012
In CTCrypt 2012, workshop held in English, in Russia, July 2012.
Easy: try CryptoMiniSat
See Cryptologia Jan 2013 
and eprint/2011/626
Super naïve: it makes little sense to take our differential 
property optimised for one set of S-boxes and apply it to 
another set of S-boxes. 
Another differential property is needed; carefully 
optimised for this another set of S-boxes…
https://www.tc26.ru/documentary%20materials/CTCrypt%202012/slides/CTCrypt_rudskoy_slides_final.pdf
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9. GOST Hash
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GOST Hash
Another Russian government standard: GOST-R-34.11-94
Obligatory part of Russian national Digital Signature standard. 
Cf. Markus Michels, David Naccache, and Holger Petersen. GOST 34.10 - A brief overview of Russia’s 
DSA. Computers & Security, 15(8):725–732, 1996.
Lots of Applications of GOST Hash:
• Message authentication in (financial) networks.
• Legally binding contracts.
• Trust: electronic commerce (implemented in OpenSSL).
=> An attack on GOST Hash could be potentially much more 
serious than breaking GOST encryption…
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High Level
Very special version of Merkle-Damgard + Len.
compression 
function
512 → 256 extra 
component
(not much stronger…)
security proof?
works the same way 
collision => collision on 
the compression function
H1 Ht Ht+1 =
Ht+2
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Collisions on The Compression Function
Sometimes called pseudo-collisions: 
Because they may use intermediate values (IV or Hi) which will 
never occur in the real life…
“Certificational Weakness”: 
• Any collision on this invalidates the security proof.
But does not mean (yet) a real attack.
• Also because these conditions, again by the security proof are 
NECESSARY to develop collisions of the full hash process, this is a 
place to start working!
∆=0∆≠0
< 2128 time
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Pre-Images on The Compression Function
YX
< 2255 time
given Y compute X
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9.1. 
How to Break
GOST Compression
[Mendel-Pramstaller-Rechberger]
[Courtois- Mourouzis]
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Collisions on Compression
Goal: 
Pseudo-Collisions: 
“Stronger” Collisions: 
Hi-1 is arbitrary fixed, 
use just Mi to make it collide nevertheless
∆=0
< 2128 time
Mi
Hi-1 Hi
∆≠0
∆=0
< 2128 time
Mi
Hi-1 Hi
∆≠0
∆=0
cannot 
chose
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Inside
K,L are linear
C1,C2 are 
constants
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CICO
x∈X
CICO = Solve f(x)=y with x∈X,y ∈Y
Constrained Inputs Constrained Outputs
[term invented by the designers of Keccak SHA-3]
But how to constrain? How to choose X,Y?
“CICO Setup” problem
y∈Y
f
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Key Idea
• Select a number of linear equations on the 512 outputs
• Which induces a smaller linear space for the 256-bit 
output.
Consequently both Ps.-collisions and preimage attacks are 
possible. 
• For example if the output space is reduced to 2192 points, 
it is like breaking a hash function on 192 bits by brute 
force / collision search.
• This is if the input space is large enough…
[Mendel-Pramstaller-Rechberger]
[Courtois- Mourouzis]
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Key Idea assume 256+64+64
linear equations, 2128
obtain 64 linear 
equations, 2192
Hi-1 Mi
Hi
CICO = 
Solve f(x)=y with x∈X,y ∈Y
“CICO Setup” problem: How to choose X,Y? 
Here they are linear spaces.
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Attacks: assume 256+64+64
linear equations, 2128
obtain 64 linear 
equations, 2192
[Mendel-Pramstaller-Rechberger]
[Courtois- Mourouzis]
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Method 1 assume 256+64+64
linear equations, 2128
obtain 64 linear 
equations, 2192
[Mendel-Pramstaller-Rechberger]
FSE 2008
x0
x1
x2
x3
c0
c1
c2
c3
h0
h1
h2
h3
m0
m1
m2
m3
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Method 1 assume 256+64+64
linear equations, 2128
obtain 64 linear 
equations, 2192
[Mendel-Pramstaller-Rechberger]
FSE 2008
x0
c0
h0
m0
m1
m2
m3
k0=P(h⊕m) 64
256
64
Ps-coll./prei
with x0 =0
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Method 2 assume 256+64+64
linear equations, 2128
obtain 64 linear 
equations, 2192
[Courtois- Mourouzis]
SECRYPT 2011
x0
x1
c0=c1
h0=h1
m0
m1
m2
m3
k0=k1
64
256
64
Ps-coll.
with x0=x1
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Why 
Do This?
assume 256+64+64
linear equations, 2128
obtain 64 linear 
equations, 2192
Hi-1 Mi
Hi
Application 1:
find Ps-collisions T=296
Application 2:
find Ps-pre-images T=2192
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Pseudo-Collisions
T= 296 < 2128
GOST, Self-Similarity and Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers
© Nicolas T. Courtois, 2006-2012176
Ps-Collisions assume 256+64+64
linear equations, 2128
obtain 64 linear 
equations, 2192
Hi-1 Mi
Hi
Our input space is larger than 296.
Complexity is simply 296 due to output space 
size of 2192. Birthday paradox attack.
Important: can be made totally memoryless by known cycling techniques…
Cf. Quisquater-Delescaille, How Easy is Collision Search. New Results and 
Applications to DES. In Crypto’89, LNCS 435, pp. 408-413.
[Mendel-Pramstaller-Rechberger]
FSE 2008 appendix
Also works with our Method 2!
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Ps-Collisions assume 256+64+64
linear equations, 2128
obtain 64 linear 
equations, 2192
Hi-1 Mi
Hi
Apply birthday paradox to a set of size 296 elements in output space of size 2192.
Method 1: Efficiently generate 296 cases with x0=0.
Method 2: Efficiently generate 296 cases with x0=x1.
Easy, several methods
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Ps-Pre-Images
T=2192 < 2255
fewer methods
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Method 1 assume 256+64+64
linear equations, 2128
obtain 64 linear 
equations, 2192
[Mendel-Pramstaller-Rechberger]
FSE 2008
x0
c0
h0
m0
m1
m2
m3
k0=P(h⊕m) 64
256
64
guess 
256+64
det
guess
correct?
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Pre-Images assume 256+64+64
linear equations, 2128
obtain 64 linear 
equations, 2192
Hi-1 Mi
Hi
•With Method 1 we can first of all chose h_0,k_0
and compute c_0 which we need to obtain for a correct 
target value x_0. 
•now the triple of values (h_0,k_0,c_0) determines 
256+64+64 linear equations we fix for the inputs.  
•Random input produces the output we want with 
probability 2-192. Time complexity is simply 2192.
•For every h_0,k_0 we can determine c_0 and explore the 
input space with 2128 points. In total we can explore 
2256+64+128 possibilities, more than 2192 necessary. 
[Mendel-Pramstaller-Rechberger]
FSE 2008
with Method 1
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Method 2’ assume 256+64+64
linear equations, 2128
obtain 64 linear 
equations, 2192
not equally good
c_0⊕c_1
h0=h1
m0
m1
m2
m3
k0=k1
64
256
64
x0
x1
…
fix
impose
impose
correct?
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Pre-Images assume 256+64+64
linear equations, 2128
obtain 64 linear 
equations, 2192
Hi-1 Mi
Hi
•With Method 2’ we can fix c_0⊕c_1 such that s_0⊕s_1=0
which we want to impose, 64 affine equations.
•Other 64+256 linear equations as in Method 2: k0=k1 and 
h0=h1. 
•Now random input produces the output we want with 
probability 2-192. Complexity is again 2192.
•Problem: input space is only 2128. Works with proba 2-64. 
•Six basic variants with 2 out of 4: Works with proba 2-61.4.
•Due to GOST complementation we get 2-60.4.
•This attack only works for some final outputs.
with Method 2’ [not so good]
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Conclusion assume 256+64+64
linear equations, 2128
obtain 64 linear 
equations, 2192
Hi-1 Mi
Hi
For the GOST compression function.
We find pseudo-collisions 
in time 296. Method 1/2
We find pseudo-pre-images in time 
2192. Method 1 only.
100 % black-box methods, any block cipher.
In Method 2 needs to be same cipher twice. Self-similarity.
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10. Diffusion in GOST
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*Claims on GOST
Wikipedia April 2011: 
Cryptanalysis of GOST
…Another concern is that the avalanche effect is slower to 
occur in GOST than in DES. 
This is because of GOST's lack of an expansion 
permutation in the round function, 
as well as its use of a rotation instead of a permutation. 
Again, this is offset by GOST's increased number of 
rounds…
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DES:
1
02244
32
321
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 2 3 4
A B C D E F
W X Y Z
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1 Round + Next Round of GOST
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Carry Propagation
determine a: 
need S3, S4 and c
3       1            1
d,e known 
=> 20.6 possibilities
3 more bits known
=> 20.3 possibilities
20.0
…
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10.2. Guess-Then-Determine: 
What to Guess?
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10.2.1. 
Contradiction Immunity
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Attacks With SAT Solvers
2 strategies:
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Phase Transitions for Naïve Cryptologists:
1 dimensional
HARD ………………………. EASY
In fact we need to look 
at an exponential number of subsets! 
For Serious Cryptologists:
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UNSAT Immunity
Well chosen set of 68 bits.
UNSAT proba=39%.
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Jumps…
To increase 39% to 50% 
we need 10 more bits 
= 78 bits.
UNSAT proba=50%.
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SAT Immunity
Same set of 68 bits as before.
All the other bits 
are found in 400 s on 
one laptop i7 CPU 
=> using CryptoMiniSat x64 2.92.
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UNSAT Immunity in DES
For 8 rounds of GOST: 
it is 78 [unpublished set].
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More on UNSAT Immunity
See: 
Nicolas Courtois, Jerzy A. Gawinecki, Guangyan
Song: Contradiction Immunity and Guess-Then-
Determine Attacks On GOST, 
In Tatra Mountains Mathematic Publications, 
53 (2013), pp. 1-15?.
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****
Multiplicative Complexity in GOST
Optimal S-boxes
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Theory of Optimal S-boxes
There is a theory of “optimal S-boxes” which 
are the best possible w.r.t. linear and 
differential criteria to build ciphers…
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Affine Equivalence
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Affine Equivalence
Only 16 S-boxes 
are “good”. 
4x4 occur in Serpent, PRESENT, GOST, [AES…]
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Affine Equivalence => MC?!
Yes!
Original algorithm: see 
• Courtois Goubin Patarin, Eurocrypt 1998
Adaptation: 
• Biryukov et al, Eurocrypt 2008
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Affine Equivalence in GOST
Or do Russian code makers read French-German papers about crypto S-boxes…
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Affine Equivalence in GOST - Observations
• There was a historical evolution of GOST S-boxes towards boxes of 
type G_i which are optimal against LC/DC
• most of more recent S-boxes which appear in OpenSSL are one of the 
G_i
• BTW. 12 out of these 'optimal' S-boxes are affine equivalent to their own 
inverse. 
• Interestingly, only 9 of these 12 which are namely G_{4},G_{6},G_{7}, 
G_{8}, G_{9}, G_{10},G_{11},G_{12},G_{13} occur in our table for GOST, 
and only those which are equivalent to their inverse occur in this table.
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GOST 28148-89
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GOST-P
A version of GOST with 8x PRESENT S-box
– Only 650 G.E. 
MC = 4 each exactly (as we already proved).
The authors have obtained in 2011 for their work 
precisely on PRESENT cipher and 4-bit S-boxes, 
an “IT Security Price” of 100 000 € which is the 
highest scientific price in Germany awarded by  a 
private foundation.
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11.
DC
COMP128v1
DES, 
GOST
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GOST vs. LC and DC
Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography, 1996, 
Section 14.1. page 334 
“Against differential and linear cryptanalysis, 
GOST is probably stronger than DES”
Gabidulin 2000-2001:  
For security = 2256, 5 rounds are sufficient 
to protect GOST against linear cryptanalysis.
Moreover, even if the S-boxes are replaced by identity, and the 
only non-linear operation in the cipher is the addition 
modulo 232, the cipher is still secure against linear 
cryptanalysis after 6 rounds out of 32.
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11.1. 
The “Holy Grail” of DC
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How To Reduce The Number Of Rounds
Attack on Keyed One-Way F == 
or Keyed Hash Functions ==
MACs.
Produce extinguishing 
differentials: All ∆ bits at 0.
Each collision leads is detected 
and leads to key recovery.
Huge weakness.
few rounds
many
more
rounds
k
P=1
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COMP128v1 – Very Weak
Closed-source algorithm 
designed by the GSM 
association.
Kept secret until leaked 
and broken in 1997.
After it was BADLY broken, 
GSM Committee issued 
a statement saying it was 
just an example…
To this day the attack works and allows 
to clone many SIM cards…
We have extracted many keys…
2 rounds
many
more
rounds
k
P=1
all ∆=0
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COMP128v1 = Butterfly Algorithm, 8*5 rounds
Kx=RAND
5-round
compressionK
FK:128 -> 128 
derive new x
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Weakness : “All Zero Output Difference”
Collision for the first 2 rounds! a.k.a. “Narrow Pipe”.
KRAND
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“All Zero Output Difference” for DES?
Impossible 
for bijective functions.
The best we can hope: 
reproduction 
of small HW pattern ∆.
2 rounds k
∆≠0
∆≠0
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“All Zero Output Difference” for Round Functions
Possible for DES: 
not bijective.
Not easy 
(3 or more boxes).
Impossible for GOST: bijective.
k
∆=0
∆≠0
∆≠0∆≠0
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11.2. CPA = 
Comparative Power Analysis
[Shamir et al. 2010]
N.  Homma,  A.  Miyamoto,  T.  Aoki,  A.  Satoh,  and  A. Shamir:  
Comparative  Power  Analysis  of  Modular Exponentiation Algorithms, 
IEEE Transaction on Computers 59(6), pp. 795-807, 2010
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“All Zero Output Difference” on 32 Bits
⇒ the Same trace
⇒ If deterministic…
CPA = 
Comparative Power Analysis: Extended def: 
• Compare longer traces: 
• if identical, we have an “all-zero differential”
(all the inputs must be the same).
• Usually a CPA (better chances of success).
k
∆=0
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11.3. DC on DES
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DES:
1
02244
32
321
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 2 3 4
A B C D E F
W X Y Z
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DC on 
DES
[Biham-
Shamir]
GOST, Self-Similarity and Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers
© Nicolas T. Courtois, 2006-2012221
11.4. 
Classical DC 
or How to Get Misled
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DC Complexity
Simple “naïve” attack like  Biham-Shamir attack on DES.
Assume “Differential Property of any kind”
Propagation P = 2-X
Data Complexity = 1/P = 2X. Data can be obtained with different keys!!!! 
Time Complexity = 1/P = 2X.
This Assuming there is no “noise”.
Guess some key bits => observe an “exceptional” event 
=> right key with high proba.
Advanced differential attacks: “signal” + “noise”.
Natural Event P = 2-Y for a RP.
Propagation: P = 2-Y + 2-X for XXX rounds.
Distinguishing between two Gaussian distributions.
Q: How many standard deviations? 
Right key with proba? <= Gauss error function.
StDev = 2-Y/2 => it is sufficient to obtain 2-X = C * 2-Y/2!!!!! Complexity ≥ O(2Y/2)??
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Biham-Shamir DC and GOST
If our model was DES…
we have totally misunderstood differential cryptanalysis. 
Gabidulin 2000-2001:  
Also claimed that 7 rounds are sufficient 
to protect GOST against DC. 
GOST, Self-Similarity and Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers
© Nicolas T. Courtois, 2006-2012224
How To Be Led Astray
There are many papers about “provably security of ciphers” against DC 
and LC.  Such works was published also about GOST, even in 
2010…
⇒ In fact it is possible to CHEAT someone and to make them believe
that GOST is provably secure against DC…
⇒ While in reality GOST in insecure against DC!
How interesting…
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2 Rounds Further?
The most recent paper about this topic: 
Martin Albrecht and Gregor Leander: 
An All-In-One Approach to Differential Cryptanalysis for Small Block 
Ciphers, Preprint, eprint.iacr.org/2012/401.
In Section 1.1. page 3:
“Truncated differentials, first mentioned in [15] can be seen as a collection
of differentials and in some cases allow to push differential attacks one
or two rounds further… “
NOT QUITE …
⇒ For Russian GOST they allowed us 
to push the attack more than 20 rounds further!
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DES:
Quasi 
constant 
probability, 
or 2 cases…
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GOST vs. DES
DES: quasi constant probability. Does not become zero typically.
GOST, general case: propagation probability depends on the key. 
Can be zero.
The problem: 
For some keys it will be 0. 
With probabilities as high as ½ or similar.
If for some keys it is 0, 
then however strong it can sometimes be…
it is guaranteed to be 0 after a few rounds(!)
(assuming independent round keys…)
Our early estimation: a single differential attack on GOST would propagate 
with probability not better than 2-62 for 32 rounds. 
For most keys it would propagate with probability 0. 
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11.5. 
DC With Sets
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More Differential Cryptanalysis
[Seki, Kaneko SAC 2000]:
Sets of differentials = most general
Incomplete/truncated Differentials = With free bits…
Between 12 and 17 rounds out of 32 can be broken…
No attack beyond. 
Or it is not clear how one would proceed: signal>noise…
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Sets Of Differentials [Seki-Kaneko,Courtois-Misztal]
A → B
any non-zero a∈A, any non-zero b∈B
In this 64-bit string:
0x70707070,0x07070707
one half can be 0, 
the whole must be non-zero
224-1 differences
24 active bits
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Seki-Kaneko Split
0x70707070,0x070707071-35-7
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Seki-Kaneko Set
3 bits active per every second box.
S1357 in odd rounds 1,3,…
S2468 in even rounds 2,4,…
Rough estimation: there are only 4 bits 
coming “out” in each round. These 
differences must be 0 “by accident”.
Maybe 0x70707070,0x07070707 
propagates with probability 2-4 per 
round? 
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Seki-Kaneko Set (contd.)
4 bits coming “out” in each round. 
these differences must be 0 “by accident”.
So 0x70707070,0x07070707 propagates 
with probability 2-4 per round? 
Not quite. There are also carries: on picture 
bits 123  active, 4 always inactive, S2 will 
be active with proba about 
1-3.5/16 = 2-0.36.
So we expect 2-4-3.5*0.36 = 2-5.3.
Simulations also give 2-5.3 average 
(odd vs. even rounds, for the S-boxes of Central Bank of Russia)
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Seki-Kaneko
Is 0x70707070,0x07070707 dangerous? 
Probability 2-5.3 for 1 round.
Means 2-170 for 32 rounds.
No hope to break GOST so far. 
There is only 264+24-1 = 287
pairs with input difference 
∈ 0x70707070,0x07070707.
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Very Surprising
Propagation is MUCH better than 
expected. Already true for this old 
Japanese set from 2000. 
0x70707070,0x07070707.
Strong improvement. Examples: 
2 Rounds: predicted 2-10.6 actual 2-8.6. 
4 Rounds: predicted 2-21.2 actual 2-16.7.
8 Rounds: predicted 2-42.4 actual 2-28.4.
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11.6. 
Better Sets [2011]
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New Sets [Courtois-Misztal, 2011]
References: 
1. Nicolas Courtois, Michał Misztal: 
Aggregated Differentials and Cryptanalysis of PP-1 and GOST, 
In CECC 2011, 11th Central European Conference on Cryptology, 
Budapest 2011, post-proceedings in preparation.
=> invention of new sets
2.. Nicolas i l  Courtoisrt i , , Michai łł Misztali t l : : 
First Differential Attack On Full 32ir t iff r ti l tt   ll --Round GOST , In ICICS'11, Beijing, China, , I  I I ' , iji , i , 
pp. 216. --227, Springer LNCS 7043, 2011., ri r  , .
=> first simple attack (very slightly) faster than brute force  fir t i l  tt  ( r  li tl ) f t r t  r t  f r  2254.6.
3.. Nicolas i l  Courtoisrt i , , Michai łł Misztali t l : : 
Differential Cryptanalysis of GOSTiff r ti l r t l i  f ,  ,  
Preprint, 14 June 2011 r ri t,    eprintri t .. iacri r .org/2011/312. r / / ..
=> progressive improved approach, heuristic and not very precise r r i  i r  r , ri ti   t r  r i … 2226
4.. Nicolas i l  Courtoisrt i : : 
An Improved Differential Attack on Full GOST I r  iff r ti l tt   ll , , 
Preprint Archive, 15 March 2012, r ri t r i ,  r  , eprintri t .. iacri r .org/2012/138. r / / ..
=> symmetric + many further refinements + very careful work on i tri    f rt r r fi t   r  r f l r   individual i i l 
bits + tight [barely working] distinguishers + justification of it   ti t [ r l  r i ] i ti i r   j tifi ti  f earlier results rli r r lt  2179
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New vs. Old Sets
• Seki-Kaneko:
0x70707070,0x07070707
224-1 differences
24 active bits
naturally occurs: 2-40
• Courtois-Misztal
0x80700700,0x80700700
214-1 differences
14 active bits
naturally occurs: 2-50
simultaneously
bigger signal 
and smaller 
noise
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New Sets [Courtois,Misztal, 2011]
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0x80700700,0x80700700
Type 3+3: S836 + S836
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11.7. 
Refined Attacks
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Key Scheduling 
Essential Weakness:
Same Keys Inversed Order
+ small size << whole key.
k0
GOST: 32 bits guessed => gain 2 rounds! 
- 0.06 of the key space per round 
DES: 48 key bits guessed => 1 round
- 0.86 of the key space per round
16
8
8
32R
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New Attacks
References: 
1. Nicolas Courtois, Michał Misztal: 
Aggregated Differentials and Cryptanalysis of PP-1 and GOST, 
In CECC 2011, 11th Central European Conference on Cryptology, 
Budapest 2011, post-proceedings in preparation.
=> invention of new sets
2. Nicolas Courtois, Michał Misztal: 
First Differential Attack On Full 32-Round GOST, In ICICS'11, Beijing, China, 
pp. 216-227, Springer LNCS 7043, 2011.
=> first simple attack (very slightly) faster than brute force 2254.6
3. Nicolas Courtois, Michał Misztal: 
Differential Cryptanalysis of GOST,  
Preprint, 14 June 2011 eprint.iacr.org/2011/312.
=> progressive improved approach, heuristic and not very precise… 2226
4. Nicolas Courtois: 
An Improved Differential Attack on Full GOST, 
Preprint Archive, 15 March 2012, eprint.iacr.org/2012/138.
=> symmetric + many further refinements + very careful work on individual 
bits + tight [barely working] distinguishers + justification of earlier results 2179
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Refined Attacks [March 2012] - Symmetric
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Key Principles
constrained at 2 ends, 
arbitrary inside
constrained at 2 ends, 
arbitrary inside
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Key Principles
constrained at 2 ends, 
arbitrary inside
unconstrained 
propagation, high proba!
unconstrained 
propagation, high proba!
constrained at 2 ends, 
arbitrary inside
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11.8. 
Best Symmetric 
Result for 20 R
(best known)
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Propagation - Middle 20 Rounds
Propagation with probability???
What is Propagation??? 
20 rounds
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What is Propagation? - 20 R
For 6 middle rounds: 
We have 14 active bits, 214-1 differences.
There are 264+14-1 = 277 input differences.
Propagation with probability 2-18.7 (experimental).
There are 277-18.7 = 258.3 pairs for the 6 middle rounds.
Result: 258.3-22.2-22.2 
= 213.9 cases.
Natural: 215 .
2-22.2
2-22.2
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11.9. 
Distinguishers
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Key Result
RP GOST
213+211.9213
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Gauss Error
How many 
standard deviations?
213
RP GOST
213+211.9
Example: right key assumption rejected 
= half of this number
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Separation
Natural: 213 Attack: 213 +211.9
Crucial Question. 
Without this, NONE of differential attacks on GOST 
work. 
We need a solid argument to say that this works. 
• a quantitative argument to show that our 
distinguisher works. 
• (and then a precise computation of number of 
right keys being rejected…)
• Etc…
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Separation: Problem 
Natural: 213 Attack: 213 +211.9
Problem: it does NOT always work.
• For few rounds we get Max(213,211.9). 
• For more rounds we get 213 + 211.9.
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Step By Step 
Our plan:
• We will first work on a different case. 
Not 213 +211.9 but 215 +213.9.
– For 20 middle rounds.
• Then we will filter out 2-2 of cases.
– Also propagates for the 6+6 outer rounds. 
20
6
6
32R
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Separation For 20 Middle Rounds
Natural: 215 Attack: 215 +213.9.
Problem: it does NOT always work.
• For few rounds we get Max(215,213.9). 
• For more rounds we get 215 + 213.9.
We make an 
“artificial distinction”
assumption 
which separates 
the two sets!
20=7+6+7
def: with middle differences
holding
not 
holding
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Natural Event – Accidental Output Differences
For any 64-bit permutation: 
(does NOT have to be a RP!!!)
We have 8 active bits on each side, 28-1 differences.
There are 264+8-1 = 271 input differences.
Each works with probability 28-64 = 2-56. 
271-56 = 215 survive. 
Natural: 215
XX rounds
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Separation Failure: Less Rounds
For any permutation: we expect 215.
Propagation in the first 7 rounds: 
2-22.2 (obtained by simulation).
215 ∩ 213.9 ≠ ∅.
With few rounds in the middle the propagations 
from both directions will reinforce each other!
few rounds
+ likely, dependent
2-16.2
2-16.2
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Separation Success: More Rounds
For any permutation: we expect 215.
But only about 215-16.2-16.2 = 2-17 will have 
the middle differences required. Zero in practice.
215 ∩ 213.9 = ∅.
With more rounds no reinforcement.
6 rounds
independent
2-16.2
2-16.2
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11.10. 
Improved Attacks
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Guess Then Eliminate 
Depth-First Tree Search.
51 
bits
51 
bits
51 
bits
51+10 
bits
51+10 
bits
X X
X
X
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More Complicated
We need to guess up to 192 key bits in the first 
6 rounds. Too costly? 
How to avoid it?
Method 1: Guess 192 key bits => determine 213 
+211.9 pairs. Too costly. 
Method 2: Progressive filtering.
Guess less key bits, determine more pairs, then more key bits but less pairs etc…
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More Complicated…
Level 1: Generate Pairs by birthday approach.
Level 2: guess more key bits, eliminate cases.
116 
bits 116 
bits
116 
bits
116+28 bits
2171 2171 2171
116+28 bits
2175 2175
255 cases per key
231 cases per key
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Much Later:
Level 1:
Level 2:
Level 3:
116 
bits
116+28 bits
2171
2175
255 cases per key
231 cases per key
X
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All Steps
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11.11. 
Improved Attacks
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How To Find Such An Attack
Best differential property 
we ever found was found BY HAND.
Is systematic approach possible?
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Our Attack = Graph Walks With Costs
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Remark:
• the structure of this graph does 
NOT depend on the S-boxes
• only costs (probabilities) 
depend on the S-boxes
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13. New Attacks…
Strange Ideas…
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13.1. Amplification Paradox
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Involution => Amplification
1 pair 16 R => 
another pair for free
can we continue? 
GOST, Self-Similarity and Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers
© Nicolas T. Courtois, 2006-2012273
Bad News
continue? 
